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REFERENCE AND RESPONSE
Louis deRosset
A standard view of reference holds that a speaker’s use of a name refers to a
certain thing in virtue of the speaker’s associating a condition with that use
that singles the referent out. This view has been criticized by Saul Kripke as
empirically inadequate. Recently, however, it has been argued that a version of
the standard view, a response-based theory of reference, survives the charge of
empirical inadequacy by allowing that associated conditions may be largely or
even entirely implicit. This paper argues that response-based theories of
reference are prey to a variant of the empirical inadequacy objection, because
they are ill-suited to accommodate the successful use of proper names by pre-
school children. Further, I argue that there is reason to believe that normal
adults are, by and large, no different from children with respect to how the
referents of their names are determined. I conclude that speakers typically refer
positionally: the referent of a use of a proper name is typically determined by
aspects of the speaker’s position, rather than by associated conditions present,
however implicitly, in her psychology.
1. Introduction
In virtue of what does a use of a proper name refer to a certain thing? Until
Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, there was a standard answer, the
cognitive determination hypothesis:
CDH: A use of a proper name a refers to an individual x in virtue of the
speaker’s associating with a some condition which singles x out1
where a condition singles out an individual just in case that individual
uniquely satisfies the condition.
Kripke gave several objections to CDH. In my view, his most powerful
objection was that it is empirically inadequate: speakers simply do not
associate with many of the proper names they use information that singles
out their referents. More recently, however, it has been argued that CDH
survives this objection [Chalmers 2002a, 2002b; Gertler 2002; Jackson
1998a, 1998b]. Competent speakers are not always able to express the
condition that guides reference on cue; but CDH does not really require
otherwise. Speakers need only respond in accordance with the associated
1This view is more commonly called descriptivism. I eschew this label because the associated condition need
not be statable by a description; see Chalmers [2002b]. Kripke’s seminal discussion of CDH is [Kripke 1980].
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condition when prompted, by manifesting dispositions to identify a referent
for the name in various factual and counterfactual scenarios.
This rehabilitation of CDH has been used to push a variety of
interesting views in many different areas. It plays a central role in an
argument that, interpreted correctly, the doctrine that conceivability
entails possibility is true [Chalmers and Jackson 2001]. It is supposed to
defuse the problem posed by Kripke’s discovery of a posteriori necessities
for the view that there is a strong constitutive connection between a
priority and necessity [Chalmers 1996: 56–71]. It is held to show that a
certain kind of meta-ethical realism is true. It is the key premise in a
defence of philosophical analysis against the objections of Quine and
others [Jackson 1998a].
Any tool that gets such heavy use should be closely inspected to ensure its
soundness. The task of this paper is to assess whether the response-based
rehabilitation of CDH can ultimately avoid the sorts of problems Kripke
noticed. I will argue that it cannot, and that Kripke’s answer to the question
of the referential bond is, in this respect, better.
2. Response-Based Theories
Kripke objected to CDH on the grounds that, in many actual cases, a
competent speaker has a use of a proper name that refers, even though the
speaker does not associate with her use a strong enough condition to single
out any individual. Consider Joe, who, if asked, ‘To whom or what do you
refer by your use of ‘‘Cicero’’?’, would answer, ‘Some Roman orator or
other.’ He knows full well that the Romans went in for oratory in a big way,
and that there were lots of Roman orators. His use of ‘Cicero’ nevertheless
refers to a certain Roman orator rather than any of the others. Thus, no
condition that Joe associates with ‘Cicero’ singles out the individual to
whom his use of the name refers. Kripke argues that we know empirically
that many ordinary speakers are in Joe’s situation. So, CDH is wrong. Call
this the argument from underinformation.
Kripke’s critics have noticed that the argument from underinformation
relies on an overly strong account of association. Kripke was correct to
point out that, as an empirical matter, a speaker sometimes cannot call
to mind and articulate in words any condition that singles out the
referent of a name he uses. But any account of association that requires
so much of a speaker is implausible. We can and should give a less
demanding and more plausible account of association. Intuitively, Susan
might associate ‘The Vulcans’, the name of a local Star Trek fan club,
with its membership list, even though she is not able to rattle off the
complete list of names on cue. Evidence that Susan associates names of
members with the name of the club is provided by the fact that she is
disposed to give the correct response to questions like ‘Is So-And-So a
member of the Vulcans?’ For many Americans, this is the only sense in
which we associate such names as ‘Chester A. Arthur’ and ‘James
Buchanan’ with the U.S. presidency.
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Susan’s case points the way to an account of association that allows that
an associated condition may guide our identification of a referent, despite
being largely or entirely implicit. On this view, an associated condition must
provide the psychological basis of a disposition to respond to prompting in
accord with the condition; it needn’t also be something the speaker can call
to mind or articulate. Here’s how Jackson expresses the idea: ‘[T]ypically the
association is implicit or tacit rather than explicit. It is something we can
extract in principle from speakers’ patterns of word usage, not something
actually explicitly before their mind when they use the words’ [Jackson
1998b: 211].
For a given proper name a, call a description of a situation a-neutral if it
does not explicitly contain information about which thing is the referent of
a, and does not contain uses of a.2 Latter-day defenders of CDH endorse:
RESPONSE: A condition f is associated by a speaker S with a proper name a
iff f guides S’s responses to the question, ‘Who or what is the referent of a?’
when S is presented with an a-neutral, but otherwise complete, description of a
situation.
Let’s call a theory that combines this account of association with CDH a
response-based theory of reference. Response-based theories seem to evade
the argument from underinformation. Kripke’s empirical data were limited
to the fact that speakers can’t express any appropriate condition on cue. But
RESPONSE does not require that the associated condition be producible on
cue, or even statable in words. So Kripke’s empirical insight fails to show
that an underinformed speaker like Joe associates no suitable condition with
‘Cicero’.
Grant that Joe’s inability to express a suitable associated condition
does not by itself imply that he does not associate any such condition
with ‘Cicero’. Do we have any positive reason to think that ordinary
speakers like Joe actually do associate the right sorts of conditions with
their names? Notice that the descriptions we use as prompts will contain
some metalinguistic information, including information about the
historical provenance of the name in question. Part of a prompt for
Joe might include, e.g., ‘You acquired your use of the name ‘‘Cicero’’
from your fifth-grade social studies teacher.’3 In so far as Joe responds to
cases in the way Kripke thinks he should, he is disposed to apply some
such condition as the individual whose initial baptism with the name
‘Cicero’ is the historical source of my use of that name to specify the
referent when given a ‘Cicero’-neutral, but otherwise complete, descrip-
tion of a situation. I’ll follow the standard terminology by saying that
Joe defers to others when his associated condition relies on facts about
other people’s uses to single out an individual. It may not occur to him
to supply such metalinguistic information on cue. His dispositions to
2I don’t pretend to have given any very precise characterization of a-neutrality. Fortunately, nothing in our
discussion will turn on any controversial way of explaining a-neutrality.
3Does such a description exceed the bounds of ‘Cicero’-neutrality? Let’s assume not for the sake of argument.
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respond to cases indicate that he nevertheless associates it with his use of
the name.4
One last feature of response-based theories of reference bears mention. A
condition may in fact guide a speaker’s response to an a-neutral description
of a situation even though, because of time constraints, inattention,
impishness, error, and a variety of other circumstances, he does not identify
the right individual when prompted. Thus, only the speaker’s responses
under cognitively auspicious circumstances should count according to
response-based theories.5
3. A Consequence of Response-Based Theories
The key notion in understanding RESPONSE is the notion of a condition’s
guiding a speaker’s responses. Response-based theorists rely on an idea I have
already broached: if a certain condition guides a speaker’s identification of a
referent for her proper name, then it provides the basis of a disposition to
respond in accord with that condition [Jackson 1998b: 211–12]. Most
descriptions of situations that we use in philosophy are not true of the actual
situation—the situation in which we all find ourselves. Philosophy papers are
full of fanciful thought experiments involving teletransportation, mind-
reading, runaway trolleys, and the like. Consideration of speakers’ dispositions
to respond to descriptions false of the actual situation raises complications
concerning a distinction response-based theorists make between primary (or
A-) intensions and secondary (or C-) intensions. To avoid these complications,
I will focus on descriptions that are true of the actual situation.6 Applying
response-based views to descriptions true of the actual situation yields:
DISPOSITION: A condition f is associated with a by S only if S is disposed
to specify as the referent of a the individual (if there is one) in fact singled
out by f when presented in cognitively auspicious circumstances with a true,
a-neutral, but otherwise complete description of the actual situation.
Suppose that a speaker S’s use of a name a refers to some individual x.
According to CDH, S associates some condition f with a that singles out x.
According to DISPOSITION, S must be disposed to identify the individual
in fact singled out by f when presented with an a-neutral, but otherwise
complete, description of the actual situation. On our assumptions, the
individual in fact singled out by f is none other than x. So the conjunction
of CDH and DISPOSITION implies
CORRECTNESS: A speaker S’s use of a proper name a refers to an individual
x only if S is disposed to identify x as the referent of a when presented in
4Sometimes a view on which associating such deferential conditions is the norm for ordinary speakers is
called ‘causal descriptivism’. I avoid the terminology because it is disputed; see n. 1. But the argument of x4
applies to such views.
5For some discussion of the idealization, see Jackson [1998a: 35–7], Chalmers and Jackson [2001: 320–8], and
Chalmers [2002a: 148–9; 2004: 191ff., 208, 223 n. 15].
6This procedure is also followed in Chalmers [2006: 89ff.].
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cognitively auspicious circumstances with an a-neutral, but otherwise
complete, description of the actual situation.
CORRECTNESS says that a speaker is disposed to specify the right
individual—the referent of her use of a—when presented with the right sort
of description of the actual situation. This claim is the result of plugging into
the place where CDH mentions association any account of association that
implies DISPOSITION.
4. An Objection to Response-Based Theories
There is reason to think that CORRECTNESS is false. Consider Ethan, a
normal human male. Suppose that, as part of his religious education, we
teach Ethan to use ‘Peter’ as a name for the apostle Peter by reading him the
following story:
Peter and his friends were telling people about Jesus. The people listening
wanted to hear more! Peter told how Jesus came so that everyone could be a
part of God’s family. The people wanted to be part of God’s family. They
shared what they had and ate together.7
After hearing this story a few times, Ethan acquires enough facility with
‘Peter’ that he goes around using it to educate his friends with his newfound
knowledge that Peter was an important man who told a lot of people about
Jesus.
Here are what seem to be some evident facts. Ethan has a use of the name
‘Peter’. He uses that name to say things about a certain apostle, whom we
call ‘Peter’. He can do so because his use of that name refers to that very
man. The story itself does not provide enough information to single anyone
out. Virtually every Christian evangelist has done the deeds attributed to
Peter in our story. So knowing the story does not provide Ethan with
enough information to single out the referent of ‘Peter’. Ethan is
underinformed, and so will need to associate some deferential condition
with ‘Peter’ if CDH is to be maintained. Here’s the catch: Ethan is a three-
year-old boy. He is not disposed to respond to a ‘Peter’-neutral, but
otherwise complete, description of the actual situation by identifying the
man we all refer to by our uses of ‘Peter’ as the referent of his use of ‘Peter’.
He’s disposed to pick his nose and stare when prompted like this. It’s not
that he’s bored, distracted, or busy thinking how dumb grown-ups are; he is
not really equipped to give an answer. He has no facility with the use–
mention distinction; he lacks the cognitive resources to handle questions
that turn on the notions of reference or of a transmission of the use of a
name. Ethan simply isn’t in a position to pick out a referent for ‘Peter’ in
accord with the relevant sort of deferential condition.8
7This is the entirety of the text about Peter in Currie [2005].
8I used a hypothetical case, the case of Joe, as an expository device to focus the discussion of Kripke’s
original argument from underinformation, despite the fact that the argument is empirically based. This
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Deferring to others would require Ethan to associate with ‘Peter’ some
metalinguistic ormetacognitive condition, such as theman the people who taught
me ‘Peter’ intended to talk about using the name. Empirical research suggests that
a typical three-year-old like Ethan lacks the requisite metalinguistic and
metacognitive abilities. He can acquire proper names for animate objects, and
distinguish names from common nouns and adjectives. He may refuse to
knowingly apply such proper names to more than one thing [Katz et al. 1974;
Gelman and Taylor 1984; Hall 1994]. He cannot yet, however, pass the False
Belief Test.9 Thus, he lacks a robust capacity to answer questions that depend on
how another’s view of things differs from his own. Importantly, he can’t reliably
differentiate a word from its referent [Markman 1976].10
In summary, his cognitive resources for representing, or even responding
in accord with, metacognitive and metalinguistic conditions in the way
required by CORRECTNESS are poor or nonexistent. Ethan nevertheless
has no difficulty acquiring the use of proper names he hears, even when they
are not introduced to him by ostension. He can acquire the use of the proper
name ‘Peter’ just by hearing our use of ‘Peter’ in our story [Jaswal and
Markman 2001]. Nevertheless, absent education and further cognitive
rhetorical gambit is sound so long as our empirical evidence suggests that there is or could easily be a case
like Joe’s. I am deploying the same sort of expository device to focus the discussion of the referential abilities
of pre-schoolers. My description of Ethan is based on a real boy, but the argumentative burden of this section
is carried by the empirical evidence I adduce. This evidence suggests that there is or could easily be a case like
Ethan’s: a three-year-old who (i) uses a name to refer to someone, (ii) is underinformed, and (iii) does not
possess the cognitive wherewithal to defer to the source of his use of the name.
9In the False Belief test [Wimmer and Perner 1983], a subject is shown a play in which a protagonist sees an
item placed into a basket. The protagonist goes offstage, and the item is moved to another place. The subject
is asked where the protagonist will look first for the item. The subject passes if she correctly predicts that the
protagonist will look in the basket. The prediction appears to require the attribution to the protagonist of the
false belief that the item is in the basket. Carpenter et al. [2002] report that some three-year-olds pass less
demanding tests that don’t implicate verbal dispositions.
10Piaget [1929] discovered evidence that young children cannot differentiate words and their referents. Smith
and Tager-Flusberg report:
In the Piagetian task, for example, one asks the child if the moon could be called the ‘‘sun.’’ Although
it has been found that young children can accept this name substitution, they now attribute sun-like
properties to the moon.
[Smith and Tager-Flusberg 1982: 455]
Chaney [1992], following Smith and Tager-Flusberg [1982], reports that many three-year-olds succeed in
differentiating a word from its referent, but the experiment seems only to demonstrate that three-year-olds
succeed in picking up a new term for a familiar kind of thing. Here is a description of the task at which three-
year-olds succeeded:
We told children we were making up a new language and would therefore need new names for things.
[. . .] [T]he child was shown a picture of a carrot, and asked if its new name could be ‘‘gok.’’ [. . .] Then
the picture was removed and four true/false questions were asked about ‘‘goks.’’ Two of the
questions were true about carrots (Can you eat a gok? Are goks orange?) and two were false (Do
goks have wheels? Can you read a gok?).
[Smith and Tager-Flusberg 1982: 455]
Success at this task does not seem to require differentiating the word ‘gok’ from carrots. There is reason to
believe that pre-school children have other metalinguistic skills, manifesting knowledge of phonology and
syntax; see Chaney [1992], Smith and Tager-Flusberg [1982], Karmiloff-Smith [1986], Karmiloff-Smith et al.
[1996], and the anecdotal and experimental evidence cited by Chaney [1992: 487–9]. But the evidence
indicates that they have not mastered the distinction between name and referent required to grasp a
deferential condition. Bialystok [1986] tested the grammaticality judgments of children between ages 5 and 9.
The tasks were designed to distinguish failures owing to lack of selective control from failures owing to lack
of metalinguistic knowledge. Her results indicate that age is correlated with the ability to complete tasks
which impose demands on knowledge rather than control, suggesting that the inability of three-year-olds to
successfully differentiate word and referent is not attributable to performance error alone.
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development, the boy does not seem to have the sort of dispositions required
by CORRECTNESS.11
Importantly, Ethan does have the ability to recognize the referents of
some of his names. He knows the names of certain of his playmates, for
instance. If he were asked, ‘Who’s Julia?’ and Julia were present, he could
point to her. If I pointed to Julia and said ‘Emily looks happy today’, Ethan
could correct me by saying, ‘That’s Julia.’ It is plausible, then, to suggest
that he associates conditions with certain names that single out their
referents. Ethan would, of course, be confused if we asked, ‘To whom does
your use of ‘Julia’ refer?’ But to suggest on these grounds that Ethan does
not associate a condition with ‘Julia’ that singles out its referent is to impose
an implausibly strong interpretation of ‘identify the referent’, one on which
one fails to identify the referent of ‘Julia’ if one fails correctly to answer the
explicitly metalinguistic question, ‘To whom does your use of ‘‘Julia’’ refer?’
This suggests a response on behalf of CDH: the fact that Ethan would not
respond appropriately to the metalinguistic prompt, ‘To whom does your
use of ‘‘Peter’’ refer?’ does not indicate a failure of CORRECTNESS.12
Let’s suppose, then, that Ethan’s prompt were the object-linguistic
question ‘Who’s Peter?’ rather than the metalinguistic question ‘Who is the
referent of your use of ‘‘Peter’’?’ The object-linguistic question wouldn’t
confuse him. But he still wouldn’t be able to answer that question in a way
that would single out the relevant apostle. All of the object-linguistic
answers that Ethan can give to the object-linguistic question can be inferred
by him from the information in the story we read, and no such answer will
single any individual out. Because Ethan is underinformed, CDH demands
deference: Ethan must associate with ‘Peter’ a metalinguistic condition that
singles out a referent. To return to the example given above, Ethan must
associate some such condition as the man the people who taught me ‘Peter’
intended to talk about using the name. This is precisely the sort of condition
which empirical research suggests Ethan is ill-equipped to handle. Ethan’s
inability to represent, or even respond in accord with, metalinguistic
conditions of the right sort will pose a problem for CORRECTNESS no
matter how Ethan is prompted. So, Ethan’s case still seems to present a
counter-example to CORRECTNESS.13
Perhaps it might be urged that, though Ethan is not in a position to
respond to prompting in accord with a deferential condition, it might still be
implicitly encoded in some procedure he is disposed to use to identify a
referent for ‘Peter’. Ethan associates a deferential condition in virtue of what
he is disposed to do in order to identify a referent for ‘Peter’, rather than in
virtue of what he is disposed to say when asked to make an identification.
Suppose, for instance, that Ethan’s mother has transmitted to him the use of
11Much of the empirical work on children’s acquisition of proper names is summarized in Bloom [2000:
126ff.].
12Thanks to Christopher Hill for suggesting this response.
13Any competent user of ‘Peter’ will associate the condition being Peter with the name. But this condition
won’t determine the reference of Ethan’s use of ‘Peter’ unless he is in a position to refer to Peter
independently of having the name in his vocabulary. Thus, appealing to this associated condition would not
provide a non-circular explanation of reference for Ethan’s use of ‘Peter’; see Kripke [1980: 68–70] for a
seminal discussion of proposals that fall prey to circularity.
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a name ‘Mark’ for one of her co-workers. Ethan might be disposed, when
asked who Mark is, to turn the question over to his mother. Then, though
Ethan can’t now deploy a deferential condition to identify the correct
referent when given a ‘Mark’-neutral description of his situation, his
dispositions do indicate the presence of a deferential condition in his
psychology. In the case of ‘Peter’, the suggestion is that a response-based
theory might be defended by claiming that Ethan is disposed to turn the
question of who Peter is over to us, the people who transmitted the name to
him.
Do we have any reason to believe that ordinary children in Ethan’s
situation have any such deferential dispositions? It seems not. But even if
we suppose for the sake of argument that they do, there are two things
to note about this reply. First, the reply abandons the account of
association expressed in RESPONSE. Though it is still maintained that
the presence in Ethan’s psychology of a deferential condition is attested
by his dispositions, the dispositions in question are no longer confined to
those concerning the identification of a referent when prompted with the
right kind of description. So adopting this response sends us back to the
drawing board for a general account of association. Second, we could,
without altering the salient features of Ethan’s case, imagine that: (i)
Ethan is the sort of parent-centred child who is disposed to turn the
question ‘Who is Peter?’ over to his mother; and (ii) his mother has never
heard of the man we call ‘Peter’. For instance, we might suppose that
Ethan’s parents are immigrants from a non-Christian background, who
have enrolled Ethan in a religiously affiliated pre-school. Thus, the
deferential dispositions embedded in Ethan’s procedures for handling a
demand to identify a referent for his use of ‘Peter’ still would not lead
him to the correct answer.14
5. Three Avenues of Resistance
There are three strategies available to response-based theorists for avoiding
the problem apparently posed by Ethan’s case: (i) deny that Ethan has a use
of ‘Peter’ at all; (ii) deny that Ethan’s use of ‘Peter’ refers to the relevant
apostle; or (iii) insist that Ethan really is disposed to defer to us. We’ll take
each avenue of resistance in turn.
It would not be plausible to deny that Ethan has a use of ‘Peter’ in his
vocabulary. He is not just a parrot or recording device. He displays all the
normal symptoms of ordinary linguistic competence with a proper name. He
can produce and respond to novel sentences, and correctly answer questions
we might pose using the name ‘Peter’ on the basis of the information we
have given him. He can, for instance, correctly answer the question, ‘Was
14An objection to response-based theories on the basis of the referential and cognitive abilities of young
children has previously been made in Schiffer [2003: 147–9]. Such an objection is also implicit in the claim in
Byrne and Pryor [2006: 52] that response-based theories place implausibly high demands on understanding
what someone else says.
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Peter a woman?’ And he does this in the same way (whatever that is) as
other linguistically competent human beings.15
Turn now to the second avenue of resistance, claiming that Ethan’s use of
‘Peter’ does not refer to the relevant apostle. On this response, we have
succeeded in teaching Ethan some stories, but the stories he learned are not
about anyone.16 This is not plausible either. Our own use of ‘Peter’
uncontroversially refers to the relevant apostle. In virtue of deploying this
use, we gave Ethan information about the relevant apostle. Now Ethan is
repeating this information, using such sentences as, ‘Peter was a man who
told a lot of people about Jesus.’ When he speaks, what he says is true. And
it is true in part in virtue of the fact that the use of ‘Peter’ Ethan deploys
refers to an individual who was in fact a man who told a lot of people about
Jesus. These are the sorts of abilities that indicate that Ethan’s use of the
name ‘Peter’ refers to the relevant apostle. At least, this is how matters seem,
and we have no reason independent of antecedent commitment to CDH not
to take appearances at face value.
A defender ofCDHmight nevertheless insist that, because we have assumed
that Ethan’s dispositions to defer would not lead to the relevant apostle, we
should not attribute reference to the relevant apostle in Ethan’s case. Ethan,
unlike us, lacks dispositions to identify a certain referent for ‘Peter’. The
defender ofCDHdenies that adultswith such aberrant dispositions refer to the
same individuals as the rest of us. Consider Avinash, a normal adult, who
announces that he associates being the personwhofirst formulated the axioms of
first-order arithmetic with his use of ‘Peano’. Imagine that his dispositions to
respond to cases accord with his announcement. The defender of CDH holds
that Avinash does not associate misinformation with ‘Peano’, because
Avinash’s use of ‘Peano’, unlike ours, refers to Dedekind [Jackson 1998a:
32]. What additional cost in plausibility is incurred by insisting that Ethan’s
use likewise fails to refer to the relevant apostle?
There is an important difference between the two cases. Avinash
announces the conditions under which his use of ‘Peano’ refers to a certain
individual. His claim is seconded by his dispositions to respond. This lends
some plausibility to the application of CDH to Avinash’s case. Ethan is
unable to make or even understand such a proclamation. Nevertheless, we
endeavour to teach him something about the relevant apostle by giving the
name to him, albeit without providing him with enough information to
single the referent out. And, without knowing or caring what Ethan’s
deferential dispositions are, we pre-theoretically take this endeavour to be
successful when Ethan starts deploying a use of ‘Peter’ to repeat what we
told him and infer new claims. In the light of these facts, denying that
Ethan’s use of ‘Peter’ refers to the relevant apostle is implausible.
Importantly, our transmission of ‘Peter’ to Ethan is an entirely normal
way to provide a child of his age with the use of a name. The story about the
15Empirical study of children’s ability to acquire proper names takes these abilities (together with the ability
to act in ways indicated by the subject’s inferences using the name) to indicate successful acquisition of a use
of the proper name. See, e.g., the studies cited in x4.
16At least, they are not determinately about anyone. This qualification does not improve the plausibility of
the response.
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relevant apostle that we used to transmit ‘Peter’ to Ethan is a direct
quotation from an actual children’s book. The idea is to teach children a
story about a particular person. It is plausible to think that the author also
wants to teach children to use and understand the name ‘Peter’, so that
further educational efforts can use that name to add to the children’s store
of information about the relevant apostle. The story itself nevertheless
provides nowhere near enough non-metalinguistic information to single
anyone out. It won’t even differentiate Peter from the friends mentioned in
the story. There is no reason to think that the children who thereby acquire
a use of the name are disposed to defer to people who use ‘Peter’ to refer to
the relevant apostle. Perhaps the author’s efforts here are quixotic. But we
wouldn’t ordinarily have supposed so.
Of course, the defence of CDH at hand—that Ethan’s use of ‘Peter’ does
not refer to the relevant apostle—is not inconsistent. But one lesson of
Kripke’s original argument from underinformation is that we appear to
have empirical knowledge of the reference of speaker’s uses of names that is
independent of the application of any particular theory of reference. We
don’t need to presume any theory of reference, for instance, to recognize
with Kripke that there are speakers who have no relevant classical education
but nevertheless have uses of ‘Cicero’ that refer to Tully. Against this
empirical background, responding to the argument from underinformation
by denying such a claim would come at significant cost in plausibility. A
defender of CDH could without inconsistency apply his theory and claim
that there are no such people. But this result, though not inconsistent, is
implausible. Perhaps for this reason, defenders of CDH don’t rest their case
on such a denial, instead weakening their account of association to
accommodate the empirical data.
It seems to me that Ethan’s case is no different in this respect. As the
example from the storybook illustrates, we don’t need to presume any
theory of reference to recognize that there are children in Ethan’s situation
who have uses of ‘Peter’ that refer to the relevant apostle. Against this
empirical background, denying that this is so is implausible. Thus denying
that Ethan’s use of ‘Peter’ refers, while not inconsistent or incoherent, is
implausible.
We have supposed that Ethan apparently lacks any deferential disposi-
tions, other perhaps than a disposition to defer to his mother, who has never
heard of the relevant apostle. The third avenue of resistance is to claim that,
despite appearances, Ethan really is disposed to defer to us, the source of his
use of ‘Peter’. To avoid the charge of special pleading, it might be argued
that Ethan’s apparent lack of a disposition to defer to us is really just
evidence that he is in cognitively inauspicious circumstances; under ideal
circumstances, he would either turn the question ‘Who is Peter?’ over to us
or identify as the referent of ‘Peter’ the individual to whom we refer by our
use of the name.
I’ll make two comments about this response. First, Ethan’s apparent lack
of a disposition to defer to the causal source of his use of ‘Peter’ seems no
more indicative of cognitive defect than the lack of deferential dispositions
on the part of Avinash. Avinash’s use of ‘Peano’ has someone else’s use of
10 Louis deRosset
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‘Peano’ in its causal past. He is nevertheless not disposed to defer to that
person. The defender of CDH did not diagnose Avinash with a performance
error caused by some cognitively inauspicious circumstance. There seems to
be no principled reason to think that Ethan’s lack of a disposition to defer to
us is any more an indication of cognitively inauspicious circumstances than
is Avinash’s. Second, it is independently incorrect, I think, to say that
Ethan’s apparent disposition to rely on his mother rather than us indicates
some epistemic defect. This seems precisely the right epistemic policy for
Ethan to follow. He knows that his mother is an expert on matters that
concern him and has his best interests at heart. If, as we may assume, Ethan
knows not to rely on strangers unless he has no choice, relying on his mother
is clearly the better alternative. He should trust his mother, rather than us,
to help him on questions he has trouble answering. For these reasons, we
have no grounds to discount Ethan’s lack of a disposition to defer to us as
symptomatic of cognitive defect. Thus, the claim that Ethan has a deeply
buried disposition to defer to the source of his use of ‘Peter’ is pretty
implausible, both on its own merits, and on the antecedent commitments of
response-based theories. But is it too bitter a bullet to bite? Maybe not, if
there is no prospect other than a response-based theory of reference for
explaining Ethan’s referential abilities.
6. Reference Without Response
6.1 The Causal–Historical Theory
Fortunately, there is a genuine alternative to response-based theories: the
causal–historical theory of reference. The causal–historical theory explains
the reference of a use of a proper name in terms of the speaker’s historical
position, and independently of what conditions are present in her
psychology.17 A speaker’s use of ‘Aristotle’, for instance, refers to a certain
man in virtue of the fact that the name has a history of uses, one derived
from another, that both terminates in her use and traces back to an original
use of the name (or one of its predecessors) to refer to that individual.
Ethan’s case, not to mention the actual successful use of proper names by
millions of children worldwide every day, strongly suggests the picture of
reference sketched by the causal–historical theory. Ethan—like other
children—is an unreflective opportunist. He is lucky enough to have
acquired a use of the proper name ‘Peter’ from us. He can occupy this
position and take advantage of it without being able to describe it, without
being guided by a description of it, without, indeed, being aware, even
implicitly, of most of its relevant features. Ethan isn’t born referring to
Peter; and he doesn’t achieve reference to Peter by associating some
condition with ‘Peter’; he has reference thrust upon him when we transmit to
him the use of the name. I will say a speaker refers positionally when she uses
17See Kripke [1980], Donnellan [1974], and Evans [1973] for seminal discussion of causal–historical
theories.
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a proper name that refers in virtue of her actual position, rather than of her
appreciation, however implicit and dispositional, of its relevant aspects. To
round out the terminology, I will say a speaker refers associatively when the
reference of her use of a proper name is explained by way of associated
conditions.18 According to CDH, whenever a use of a proper name refers,
the speaker refers associatively.
Accepting that we refer positionally helps us avoid the battery of
problems for CDH posed by situations like Ethan’s. Positional reference
does not depend on the existence of implicit dispositions or other hidden
features in the mental lives of children and the cognitively disabled. This is
an advantage for the causal–historical theory.
6.2 Association Without Response
The causal–historical theory evades the empirical problems encountered by
response-based theories of reference by abandoning CDH. There is,
however, a more conservative alternative: keep CDH, but deny RE-
SPONSE, discarding the idea that there is a strong tie between association
and the speaker’s responses to prompting under cognitively auspicious
circumstances.
What might association come to if we reject RESPONSE? Some
defenders of CDH hold that the notion of an associated condition is to be
explained in normative, rather than psychological, terms. This merits calling
the view normativism. According to normativism, response-based theories
go wrong by explaining association in terms of the dispositions that speakers
do have; the idea should be explained instead in terms of the dispositions
that speakers ought to have. In Chalmers’s version of the view, the norms in
question are epistemic norms governing the speaker’s concepts. These norms
underwrite a priori entailments from a-neutral descriptions of situations to
identifications of a referent for a. Thus a condition f is associated by a
speaker with a name a only if there is an a priori entailment from an a-
neutral, but otherwise complete, description of that speaker’s situation to an
identification of a certain individual—the one singled out by f—as the
referent of a.19
Normativism makes available the claim that pre-schoolers like Ethan can
and do associate deferential conditions with their uses of proper names,
despite lacking the correlative deferential dispositions. Their cognitive
limitations prevent them from possessing the dispositions that they ought to
have. A speaker’s actual dispositions on this view are merely diagnostic.
They are useful for diagnosing the presence of an associated condition, but
it’s no part of the theory of reference that they be present in all cases.20
18Notice that it is not enough for associative reference that a speaker happen to associate with her use of a
proper name a condition which singles out its referent. Her use must also refer in virtue of this fact.
19See Chalmers [2002b]. Some of what Chalmers says there suggests a response-based theory instead; see, for
instance, the passage quoted below, which concerns what speakers would do, rather than what a priorities
there are. The texts cited and quoted in x2 above indicate that Jackson rejects normativism.
20Thanks to two anonymous referees for pointing out the need to discuss this way of amending the
response-based view.
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The argument of x4 against response-based theories does not readily apply
to normativism. But that’s because any version of normativism that avoids
that argument grants much of what is at stake in the present dispute between
response-based and causal–historical theorists. Call the kind of association
characterized by RESPONSE and DISPOSITION dispositional association;
call the kind of association on which normativism relies normative
association. All parties to the discussion should agree that we often
dispositionally associate names with conditions. The normativist, like the
causal–historical theorist and unlike the response-based theorist, holds that
dispositionally associated conditions do not fix the reference of a name. The
normativist avoids the problems posed by Ethan’s case by unmooring the
account of association from any psychological ability (other than the ability
to use ‘Peter’ to refer to the relevant apostle) or propositional attitude
plausibly attributable to Ethan. The normativist defence sketched above and
the causal–historical theory part ways on the question of which features of
Ethan’s position are relevant to fixing the reference of ‘Peter’. But they agree
that no condition singling out the referent of ‘Peter’ (other than being Peter)
need ever be present at any time, even implicitly or incipiently, in Ethan’s
psychology, guiding his responses. Both views deny Jackson’s [1998b: 211]
claim, quoted above, that ‘we can extract in principle from [Ethan’s] patterns
of word usage’ a condition which singles a referent out. In short, the
normativist avoids the x4 argument by holding that Ethan refers positionally.
A symptom of the subtle but important differences between normativist
and response-based theories of reference is that normativism is not well-
suited for some of the uses to which response-based theories have been put.
For instance, response-based theorists can use associated conditions to
ground a claim of a priority. Response-based theories contend that
dispositionally associating a condition f with a proper name a does the
work of a reference-fixing stipulation for a. The response-based theorist can
then claim with Kripke [1980: 79 n.] that such a reference-fixing stipulation
(or association) grounds the a priori knowledge that a is uniquely f if
anything is. So, dispositional association is a source of a priori knowledge
according to response-based theories. Normativist theories, by contrast,
deny that dispositional association plays any direct role in fixing reference,
so they cannot appeal to dispositional association to ground a priority
claims in the simple way that response-based theories do. What’s more, on
Chalmers’s development, the kind of association that does fix the reference
of a name, normative association, relies on the a priority of the relevant
claims. Normatively associating a condition with a name is not a source of
the relevant a priori knowledge; it is the result of it.
The bottom line: the point of the argument involving Ethan is to show
that children in Ethan’s situation refer positionally. If that argument
succeeds, it takes response-based theories, as well as some of the uses to
which such theories have been put, off the table. But it leaves both causal–
historical and normativist theories on the table. Nevertheless, I favour the
causal–historical theory over normativism. Though here is not the place
for the sort of extended treatment the issue deserves, let me briefly indicate
why.
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We have evidence, even on the normativist account of association, that
Ethan associates no condition with his use of ‘Peter’ that singles out the
relevant apostle. While it’s true on this view that a speaker’s dispositions to
identify a referent are merely diagnostic, it’s important to remember that they
are, well, diagnostic. The normativist agrees that Avinash associates no
deferential condition with his use of ‘Peano’, and Joe associates no non-
deferential condition with his use of ‘Cicero’.Why think so? Because they lack
suitable dispositions to identify a referent in accord with any such condition.
But now consider Ethan’s case. Ethan’s lack of a disposition to identify a
referent for his use of ‘Peter’ given the right sort of prompt is good evidence
that he associates no appropriate condition with that use. A normativist
discounts this evidence as misleading: Ethan does, despite appearances to the
contrary, associate some suitable condition with his use of the name.
Do we have any reason to think that the evidence provided by Ethan’s
dispositions is misleading? What normativists say about the argument from
underinformation does not help with the case at hand. Chalmers’s reply to
the argument from underinformation presumes that underinformed speak-
ers are disposed to defer:
[W]hen speakers use a name such as ‘Go¨del’ or ‘Feynman’ in cases [of
underinformation], how do they determine the referent of the name, given
sufficient information about the world? . . . The answer seems clear: [they] will
look to others’ use of the name.
[Chalmers 2002b: 170]
I have argued in effect that (i) whether underinformed speakers will look to
others’ use of a name is an empirical question, and (ii) the empirical data on
three-year-olds suggest that they won’t. Chalmers offers a different reply in
unpublished remarks (quoted with the author’s permission):
[W]hat matters [according to normativism] is not whether the boy (in his far-
from-ideal cognitive state) can actually make the inferences in question, but
whether idealized a priori reasoning with the boy’s concepts would support
them. This requires that the boy’s inferences are subject to certain rational
norms (so the relevant inferences might be justified if made), but not that the
boy’s reasoning actually meets those norms. [. . .] [I]n the case of an ordinary
language-using child [like Ethan], it is plausible that the relevant epistemic
structure is present.
[Chalmers 2002c]
However plausible it may be that Ethan’s concepts license inferences in
accord with a deferential condition, it is more plausible, given the evidence
of his dispositions, that his concepts only license inferences in accord with
some non-metalinguistic condition like being an important man who told a lot
of people about Jesus. This diagnosis won’t serve the purposes of CDH, but
it is the one that Ethan’s dispositions recommend.21
21Indeed, if we claim that Ethan’s dispositions to respond to cases are misleading, one might wonder why we
should think that Ethan normatively associates a deferential condition with ‘Peter’ at all. We have at hand no
reason to think that Ethan is in a situation relevantly like Joe’s, in which he is governed by epistemic norms
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Thus, Ethan’s case presents a challenge for normativism which has not yet
been met: provide a reason for discounting the evidence provided by Ethan’s
deviant dispositions, but not discounting the evidence provided by the
deviant dispositions of speakers who, like Avinash, refuse to defer. By
contrast, the causal–historical theory handles cases like Ethan’s easily and
naturally. This is, ab initio, a reason to favour the causal–historical theory.
In summary, we have some reason to believe that normativism faces the
same problems as response-based theories in cases like Ethan’s. But even if it
is better off in these cases, it concurs with the main conclusion of x4, that
three-year-olds like Ethan refer positionally. In what follows, I set
normativism aside.
7. Does Ethan’s Case Make Bad Law?
Perhaps a sympathizer with CDH might agree that Ethan’s case fits the
causal–historical theory better than it does the response-based theory. He
might insist, however, that Ethan’s case is quirky; it gives us no good reason
to doubt applications of the response-based theory to normal adults. On this
view, unreflective opportunism is a stage that normally developing
language-users grow out of. Adding some plausibility to this mixed view
of reference is the fact that it seems as if, sometimes, the correct explanation
of how something comes to be the referent of a speaker’s use of a proper
name proceeds in terms of associated conditions. Thus, Gareth Evans,
perhaps, might be credited with a referring use of the name ‘Julius’ in virtue
of associating with that name a condition, being the inventor of the zipper,
which singles someone out [Evans 1979, 1982: 31].
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that CDH is true in Evans’s case. I
have claimed that it is false in Ethan’s case. The proponent of the mixed
view of reference, whom I’ll call a preponderantist, suggests that Evans’s case
is the norm, and Ethan’s is the exception. Preponderantists hold that cases
like Ethan’s deserve acknowledgment in a footnote of the account of
reference. According to the causal–historical account, by way of contrast,
cases like Ethan’s are the norm, and it is ‘Julius’ that belongs in a footnote.22
I suspect that preponderantism is incorrect. The question of whether
preponderantism is true is in large measure empirical. I want to close,
however, by highlighting a difficulty that the preponderantist position faces.
I will argue in effect that Ethan’s case is not so easily dismissed as a quirky
outlier, because all of us used to be relevantly like Ethan. Preponderantists
hold that normal human beings start life as unreflective opportunists, and
then later come, by and large, to refer in virtue of associating conditions
with their names. There is reason to believe that this is not a plausible
developmental hypothesis.
warranting inferences in accord with a deferential condition, rather than a situation relevantly like Avinash’s,
in which he normatively associates some non-deferential condition with ‘Peter’ instead. Antecedent
commitment to CDH might give us reason to think so, but CDH is precisely what is at issue.
22I broach preponderantism as a natural way to preserve the spirit of CDH without biting any bullets
regarding the referential abilities of children. To the best of my knowledge there are no actual
preponderantists, perhaps because language use by children does not figure centrally in the literature.
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To secure the plausibility of this developmental hypothesis, the
preponderantist needs to explain why we stop referring positionally as we
mature. Two candidate explanations spring to mind. The first candidate is
that the ability to refer positionally atrophies or disappears entirely over the
course of normal development. We do have abilities early in life that atrophy
over the course of normal maturation. Most of us used to have the ability to
put our toes in our mouths. Almost all of us who used to have that ability
have lost it. But the outlines of the explanation of why we lost the ability are
pretty clear. Human beings normally lose flexibility as our bodies grow and
strengthen. Our bodies change shape as they grow: their limbs elongate, and
the size of the head decreases in proportion to the size of the rest of the body.
Thus, there is less flexibility available to us, even as the changing shape of our
bodies demands more flexibility to get the toes and mouth into position. In
short, the ability of infants to put their toes into their mouths is explicable in
terms of the shape and other properties of their bodies. These features change
as we mature, explaining why we lose the ability.
But no such explanation is going to be forthcoming with respect to the
ability of normal three-year-olds to refer positionally. That ability is
explained in terms of their ability to acquire the use of a proper name from
someone else, and the causal and historical pedigree of their use of the name.
Neither of those features changes over the course of development in ways
that substantially weaken the ability to refer positionally. It’s not plausible,
then, to claim that the ability to refer positionally atrophies or disappears
over the course of normal development.
The second candidate explanation for why we stop referring positionally
claims that referring positionally is less convenient, once we acquire the
ability to refer associatively. Once we can refer associatively, we typically
do. Again, we have other abilities that fit this profile. Most of us once got
around by crawling on all fours. In the course of normal development, most
of us acquired the ability to walk instead. Now, though we retain the ability
to crawl, we don’t use it very much, because it is less efficient and convenient
than walking. No similar explanation fits the case of positional reference.
Deferring to that use of ‘Peter’ from which one’s own use is derived is a
significant cognitive achievement, requiring facility with the use–mention
distinction, the notion of the derivation of one use of a name from another,
and the rest. This cognitive work is no more convenient or efficient than
simply using a name when in a position like Ethan’s. The same goes, even
for those who do not defer, but associate some more mundane condition
with their use of a proper name. Evans’s manner of using ‘Julius’ is not more
convenient or efficient than Ethan’s manner of using ‘Peter’. In fact, I
suspect that the opposite is true. Thus, though it is in large measure an
empirical question whether we normally grow out of referring positionally, I
think there are reasons to suspect that we don’t.23
23Joshua Schechter has suggested (without endorsing) that a preponderantist might decline the
developmental hypothesis we’ve been discussing in favour of the claim that attributions of reference are
standard-sensitive. Normally we cease to meet the standards for attribution of reference, on this suggestion,
because the standards have changed; not because we ourselves have undergone some sort of psychological
development. Similarly, because the relevant standards are different, one might perfectly truly claim that
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The preponderantist, then, faces a challenge: find a plausible explanation
of the progression from the universally positional reference of the child to
the alleged preponderantly non-positional, associative reference of the adult.
Over the course of maturation, we undergo many cognitive changes. Why
do these changes cause us to stop referring positionally, at least in the
majority of cases? Notice that the causal–historical theory avoids this
challenge. The developmental story proposed by the causal–historical theory
is very simple: the referential abilities of adults are, by and large, of precisely
the same sort and get exactly the same kind of explanation as the referential
abilities of children.24
8. Conclusion
This paper presents, in rough outline, an extended modus ponens argument.
Against CDH, I claimed that Ethan refers positionally; against preponder-
antism I argued in effect that if Ethan refers positionally, then, by and large,
so does just about everyone; thus, just about everyone, by and large, refers
positionally.
Someone, long ago, was well-placed to refer to Cicero. Now, because of
our de facto historical position, we are well-placed to refer to Cicero, even
though we (or those of us without classical education) wouldn’t know
Cicero from Seneca. We don’t need to be able to point to him, or apprehend
some condition that singles him out (other, perhaps, than being Cicero).
Possessing an appropriately-derived use of ‘Cicero’ suffices. According to
the theory of evolution by natural selection, so long as we are appropriately
situated (i.e., so long as our local environment is relevantly similar to our
ancestors’), we benefit from our biological ancestors’ reproductive successes.
Similarly, when we refer positionally, so long as we are appropriately
situated, we benefit from our linguistic ancestors’ referential successes. In
neither case do the conditions by which we benefit have to be present, even
implicitly, in our psychology.25
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Ethan is a fast runner, while denying that an adolescent with the same foot-speed is a fast runner. (See
MacFarlane [2005] for a run-down of semantic proposals for accommodating standard-sensitive
attributions.) The problem with this response is that the claim of standard-sensitivity is implausible: it
would imply that if Ethan grew up, but maintained his present dispositions, then he would no longer have a
use of ‘Peter’ which refers to the relevant apostle. Imagine that Ethan is properly considered a fast runner.
Suppose that he were administered a sleeping potion, and awoke fifteen years later with the same foot-speed
and the same dispositions. He’s certainly no longer a fast runner but, intuitively, he still has a use of ‘Peter’
that refers to the relevant apostle.
24There are exceptions. Evans’s use of ‘Julius’ may be one. Also, reference for original uses of names is not
explained by the causal–historical theory in the same way as derived uses.
25Versions of this paper were read at Brown University, Northwestern University, and the University of
Virginia. Special thanks to David Chalmers, Sin yee Chan, David Christensen, Terence Cuneo, Tyler
Doggett, Brie Gertler, Richard Heck, Randall Harp, Christopher Hill, Don Loeb, Mark Moyer, Derk
Pereboom, Guy Rohrbaugh, and Joshua Schechter for helpful comments and criticism. Thanks also to Benj
Hellie, Frank Jackson, and Jessica Wilson for helpful discussion of some of the underlying issues.
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